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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
I

The proceedings from which Plaintiff/Appellant
appeals was a hearing on the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond
Uno presiding, which Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Utah "Limitation of Landowner

Liability" statute, Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 et. seq. (1979)
should be applied to bar Plaintiff's claim against
Defendant.
(A)

Whether Butterfield Canyon road is properly
covered by the statute.

(B)

Whether the Plaintiff's activity at the time
of his injury was properly considered to be
a "recreational activity" within the purview
of the statute.

Utah Code Ann. §57-14-1 LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
The purpose of this act is to encourage public and
private owners of land to make land and water areas available
to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their
liability toward persons entering thereon for those purposes.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellant brought an action against Salt
Lake County for negligent maintenance of the roadway
commonly known as Butterfield Canyon, located in the
Southwest corner of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Defendant moved for a Summary Judgment and a
hearing was held before the Honorable Raymond Uno, District
Judge, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

From a grant of Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff/Appellant files this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 18, 1987, Butterfield Canyon Road was
maintained by Salt Lake County as part of its public road
system.

(R74)

The road was a narrow mountain road that

traversed the Oquirrh Mountains from Salt Lake Valley to
Tooele Valley. The road is used primarily as access to
recreation areas and secondarily to get to and from Tooele
and Salt Lake County.
The Plaintiff and his brother at some time after
1:30 A.M. August 18, 1987, were driving up the Butterfield
Canyon Road enroute to the Kennecott Lookout, when the
vehicle Plaintiff was driving struck a large rock protruding
up from under the normally travelled portion of the road.
The rock and excessive speed caused the vehicle to be thrown
over the side of the canyon.

The Plaintiff at the time of

his injury was traveling on a public road enroute to the
Kennecott Lookout for purposes of sightseeing, but never
entered those premises.
(Deposition Tracy Jerz p. 5 L. 11-16)

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah "Limitation of Landowner Liability Act"
has recently been reviewed in the case of Crawford v. Tilley
118 Utah Adv. Rep. 32. The Court's holding^ represents a
narrow application of the Statute, in that landowners who do
not make their property available to some members of the
public for recreation may not invoke protection of the act.
Protection is granted only under circumstances that would
encourage the landowner to make land available to the public
without compensation.
The public road where Plaintiff suffered his
injuries is not protected by a statute designed to promote
outdoor recreation because the road in any event, would
remain open for traversing the Oquirrhs from Tooele to Salt
Lake County.

Further, the Plaintiff while (driving on the

canyon road enroute to the Kennecott Lookout and at the time
of his injuries was not engaged in a recreational activity.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE UTAH "LIMITATION OF LANDOWNER LIABILITY"
STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO BAR PLAINTIFF'S ACTION.
In the District Court the Defendant's motion for
Summary Judgment argued that the Plaintiff's action was
barred by the Utah "Limitation of Landowner Liability" Act
(Utah Code Ann, §57-14-1 ejt seq. (1953 as amended
(hereinafter referred to as the "statute").

The main

argument made by Defendant was that Plaintiff was
sightseeing at the time of the accident and Salt Lake County
is exempt from liability because the "road" constituted
"land" as defined in U.C.A. 57-14-2.

Section 57-14-1 U.C.A.

requires that the recreational user enters the property for
those purposes.

In the instant case the Plaintiff was

simply traversing the canyon road to get to the Kennecott
Copper Lookout.
This Court, in Crawford v. Tilley, 118 Utah Adv.
Rep. 12 has interpreted and applied the statute narrowly
requiring a land owner to allow use of his property to a
part of the general public before the exemption can be
claimed.

As this Court didf nearly all Courts in states

with statutes protecting landowners from liability for
injuries to recreational users have interpreted and applied
those statutes narrowly, offering guidance on the lands,
users and activities which should be covered.
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(See, e.g.,

Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co., 403 A.2d 9l0, (N.J. 1979)
("Statutes such as the Landowner's Liability Act, granting
immunity from tort liability, should be given narrow
range.").

See generally, 47 ALR 4th Effect of Statute

Limiting Landowner's Liability for Personal Injury to
Recreational User 262 (1986) .

It is true that reading of

certain landowner liability statutes in some jurisdictions
is broader than in others.

However, a careful reading of

the relevant and applicable cases) (i.e., an injury on a
public road to a person not engaged in a recreational
activity at the time supports Appellant's position that the
rational and commonly - accepted interpretation of the Utah
Statute does not preclude Appellant's recovery for
Defendant's negligent maintenance of the roadway.
A.

THE DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY IS NOfT COVERED
BY THE STATUTE

The Utah Statute defines "land" broadly to include
"roads, water, water courses, private ways iand buildings".
Utah Code Ann. §57-14-2(1) (1953 as amended).

Nevertheless,

the statute must be construed in a manner consistent with
its avowed purpose.

The purpose of the statute is

explicitly stated in Section 57-14-1:
... to encourage owners of land to make
land and water areas available toi the
public for recreational purposes by
limiting their liability toward persons
entering thereon for those purposes,
(emphasis added)
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In this case, the Plaintiff did not enter upon the
Butterfield Canyon road for recreational purposes.

The

"use" was solely for the purpose of getting to the Kennecott
Copper Lookout.

The recreational "use" must be on the land

of the owner claiming the exemption of the act.

A public

road, commonly used as such, does not come within the purview
of the act.

B.

THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTIVITY WAS NOT A
"RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY" WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE

The Utah Landowner Liability Statute defines
"recreational purpose" to include viewing or enjoying
historical, archeological, scenic or scientific sites and a
list of other common outdoor recreational activities. Utah
Code Ann. § 57-14-1 (3) .

The Defendant in the lower court

argued that the Plaintiff was sightseeing and consequently
his activity came within the statute.

However, the record

discloses that Plaintiff at the time of his injuries was
driving on the public road and had not reached his
objective, the Kennecott Lookout. At the time Plaintiff's
vehicle struck the large rock on the canyon road he was
simply driving to the recreation area.
If the injured party is not engaged in a
recreational activity the statute should not apply not
withstanding the fact that the property itself might be
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termed "recreational".

In Smith v. Southern Pacific Transp.

Co. 467 So. 2d 70 (La. Ct. App. 1985), the Plaintiff was
injured when the top of his van struck a railroad overpass
in a city park.

The City argued that since the park was

recreational property and the road frequently used by
recreational users, the Louisiana landowner liability
statute should bar the Plaintiff's action.

The Court

disagreed, holding that "where persons are allowed to use
the property for purposes not associated with recreational
activities, the statutes should not apply."

Id. at 73.

It is also apparent that the statute should not
apply unless the injured party is engaged in a recreational
activity at the time of the injury.

In Smith v. Scrap

Disposal Corp., 158 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal, Ct. App. 1979), the
Plaintiff had besn fishing with friends on property adjacent
to the Defendants land.

As they were leaving, the

Plaintiff and his friends attempted to operate a bulldozer
on the Defendants property, resulting in serious injury.
The California court rejected the Defendant's contention
that the statute should apply because fishing was the "main
purpose" of the trip:

"The underlying purpose of the trip

could not be used to shield (Defendant) fr0m
liability...Plaintiff...entered Scrap's property to do
something other than to fish."

Id. at 137<

In this case, the Plaintiff and his brother were
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traveling on Butterfield Canyon Road enroute to the
Kennecott Copper Lookout to check the scenic views of Tooele
and Salt Lake Counties.

If the Plaintiff had arrived at the

Kennecott property and been sightseeing at the time of his
injuries and had not paid for those privileges then one
could claim a factual basis upon which to assert the
statutory exemption.

Extending the statutory protection for

the act of driving on a public road to another property for
sightseeing is improper because it does not serve the
purpose of the statute.

This extension does nothing to

increase public recreational access to land and water
areas.
If the statute applies to this case then what
about the individual who simply uses Butterfield Canyon Road
to travel to Tooele from Salt Lake County?

Since there is

no recreational purpose would the statute apply to bar any
claim he may have for damages?

This kind of an absurd

result was rejected in Delta Farms Reclamation District v.
Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 33 Cal. 3d 699f 660 P.
2d 1168.

In this case, the court rejected the statute's

application to public entities giving two reasons for the
limitation.

First, immunity under the recreational use act

would conflict with other California statutes expressly
assigning liability for certain actions.

(id at 1172-74).

Second, "application of (the act) to public entities would
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lead to some patently absurd results.

For example, the

Court reasoned that because the act included "structures",
it could be applied to city streets. "Therefore, an improved
but dangerously rutted street would expose a city to
liability to a bicyclist who commutes to work, even though
it was under "no duty" to keep the same street safe for the
recreational rider right behind him".

I_D at 1173.

California Courts do not apply the statute to public
entities, but the absurd result cited in the Delta Farm's
case applies in the instant case if Salt Lake County is
granted immunity.
Even when the Plaintiff has performed one of the
activities listed in the statute, the courts have looked
beyond the list to the purpose and intent of the Plaintiff's
actions.

In Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 95

Cal. App 3d 1022, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1979) the Plaintiff
was injured when she fell from a bridge while walking her
bicycle across the Defendant's property.

The California

Appellate Court reversed the lower court's finding that
Plaintiff was "hiking" and limited the statute to "only
those cases which could justifiably be characterized as
"recreational in nature." The evidence indicated the
Plaintiff was not hiking for pleasure but was going to a
market.

II) at 616. A similar result was obtained in

Dominque v. Presley of Southern Cal., 243 Cal. Rptr.312, 315
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(1988) where the Court held "the mere fact that the boy was
riding his bicycle to his friend's house (across Defendant's
property) does not make this trip...a recreational use."
To extend the statutory protection for the act of
sightseeing to include a person injured while driving on a
public road enroute to a recreation area is inappropriate
for two reasons.

First, the person is not at that time on

recreational property.

Secondly, extending immunity to Salt

Lake County under those facts does nothing to contribute to
increased public recreational access to land and water
areas.

The statute's application should be limited to those

instances where the injured party is on recreational
property and engaged in a recreational activity at the time
of the injury, not merely planning for such activity or
traveling to or from the recreational place.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasons
this Court should find no immunity under the "Limitation of
Landowner Liability Statute," reverse the lower court
decision and remand the case back for trial on the merits.
DATED this _ £ ^ d a y of

/H**<JL

,1990.

MATT BILJANI^'
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JEFFERY J. JERZ,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

%\<5%l>

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
a political subdivision of
the State of Utah,

Civil No. C88-5634

Defendant.

Judge Raymond Uno

On April 20, 1989, the above courtrtiadeand filed its
minute entry directing that summary judgment be entered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff,
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion of Jay Stone, attorney for
defendant, and in accordance with the minute entry of the court,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that summary
judgment be, and it hereby is, entered in favor of defendant and
that plaintiff have and recover nothing against defendant by his
suit herein.

DATED this

±5

day of

Qf^LLf

, 1989.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. C88-5634
Page 2
BY THE COURT:

/ RAYMOND S. UNO, Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On the 25th day of April, 1989, I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary
Judgment, to Matt Biljanic, Attorney for Plaintiff, 7355 South 900
East, Midvale, Utah 84047.

